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I. Introduction
The study of how immigration affects labor market conditions has been a central concern in labor economics for nearly three decades. The significance of the question arises both because of the policy issues involved and because the study of how labor markets respond to supply shocks can teach us much about how labor markets work. In an important sense, examining how immigration affects the wage structure confronts directly one of the fundamental questions in economics: What makes prices go up and down? David Card's (1990) classic study of the impact of the Mariel supply shock stands as a landmark in this literature. On April 20, 1980 , Fidel Castro declared that Cuban nationals wishing to move to the United States could leave freely from the port of Mariel, and around 125,000 Cubans quickly accepted the offer. The Card study was one of the pioneering attempts to exploit the insight that a careful study of natural experiments, such as the exogenous supply shock stimulated by Castro's seemingly random decision to let the people go, can help identify parameters of great economic interest. In particular, the Mariel supply shock would let us measure the wage elasticity that shows how the wage of native workers responds to an exogenous increase in supply.
Card's analysis of the Miami labor market, and of comparable labor markets that served as a control group or placebo, indicated that nothing much happened to Miami despite the very large number of Marielitos. Native wages did not go down in the short run as would have been predicted by the textbook model of a competitive labor market. Card's study has been extremely influential, both in terms of its prominent role in policy discussions and its methodological approach. 1 workforce. Borjas (2003) , in the study that introduced the approach of correlating wages and immigration across skill groups in the national labor market, found a significant negative correlation between the wage growth of specific skill groups, defined by education and age, and the size of the immigration-induced supply shock into those groups.
The Marielitos were disproportionately low-skill; around 60 percent were high school dropouts and only 10 percent were college graduates. At the time, about a quarter of Miami's pre-existing workers lacked a high school diploma. As a result, even though the Mariel supply shock increased the number of workers in Miami by 8 percent, it increased the number of high school dropouts by almost 20 percent.
The unbalanced nature of this supply shock suggests that we should look at what happened to the wage of high school dropouts in Miami before and after Mariel.
Remarkably, this trivial comparison was not made in Card's (1990) study and, to the best of my knowledge, had not been conducted before the first draft of this paper was released. 4
By focusing on this very specific skill group, we obtain an entirely new perspective of how the Miami labor market responded to an exogenous supply shock.
II. Data
The migration of large numbers of Cubans to the United States began shortly after Fidel Castro's communist takeover on January 1, 1959. By the year 2010, over 1.3 million Cubans had emigrated.
The first large-scale data set that precisely identifies an immigrant's year of arrival is the 2000 decennial census. Prior to 2000, the census microdata reported the year of arrival in intervals (e.g., 1960-1964) . I merged data from various censuses and the 4 Card (1990 , Table 7 ) reports labor market outcomes for the subsample of black high school dropouts, but does not report any other pre-post Mariel differences for the least educated workers. Monras (2014) examined wage trends in the sample of workers who have at most a high school diploma; his evidence is suggestive of the findings reported in this paper. Finally, three months after this study was released as an NBER working paper (Borjas, 2015) , Peri and Yasenov (2015) re-examined the data for high school dropouts and concluded that Card's results stood the test of time. The Peri-Yasenov study, however, looked at wage trends that were contaminated by various sampling decisions. They examined the pooled earnings of men and women, but ignored the changing gender composition of the workforce; included non-Cuban Hispanics in the analysis, even though many of those Hispanics were immigrants who arrived after 1980; and included teenagers aged 16-18, even though most of these teenagers were enrolled in high school and were classified as high school dropouts because they did not yet have a diploma. Borjas (2016) documents the biases created by these methodological choices.
American Community Surveys (ACS) to construct a mortality-adjusted number of Cuban immigrants for each arrival year between 1955 and 2010. 5 For example, I used the 1970 census to estimate the number of Cubans who arrived in the United States between 1960 and 1964, and then used the detailed year-of-migration information in the 2000 census to allocate those early immigrants to specific years within the 5-year band. Figure 1 shows the trend in the number of Cubans migrating to the United States. Several patterns emerge from the time series. First, it is easy to see the immediate impact of the communist takeover of the island. In 1958, only 8,000 Cubans migrated to the United States. By 1961 and 1962, 52 ,000 Cubans were migrating annually. 6 The Cuban The huge spike in 1980, of course, is the Mariel supply shock. Between 1978 and 1980 , the number of new Cuban immigrants increased 17-fold, from 6,500 to 110,000. The figure shows yet another spike in 1994 and 1995, coinciding with the period of Angrist and Krueger's (1999) "Mariel Boatlift That Did Not Happen." 7 The census data clearly indicates that somehow the phantom Cubans from that boatlift ended up in the United States, making this supply shock a Little Mariel. Although the number of Little Marielitos pales in comparison to the number of actual Marielitos, it is still quite large; the number of migrants arriving in 1995 was similar to that of the early Cuban waves in the 1960s. It is also evident that there has been a steady increase in the number of Cuban migrants since the early 1980s. By 2010, about 40,000 Cubans were arriving annually.
5 In principle, the calculation also adjusts for potential out-migration by Cuban immigrants. I suspect, however, that the number of Cubans who chose to return is trivially small (although a larger number might have migrated elsewhere).
6 Full disclosure: I am a data point in the 1962 flow.
7 In 1994, Castro again toyed with the idea of permitting a boatlift, but the United States preemptively responded and rerouted many of the potential migrants to the military base in Guantanamo. Angrist and Krueger (1999) , writing before the release of the 2000 census, argued that this seemingly phantom flow had an adverse effect on Miami's black unemployment rate, raising questions about how to interpret the evidence from the Mariel boatlift that did happen. The CPS did not report a person's country of birth before 1994, so that it is not possible to measure the wage impact of the Mariel supply shock on the native-born population. I instead examine wage trends among non-Hispanic men (where Hispanic background is determined by a person's answer to the Hispanic ethnicity question), a sample restriction that comes close to isolating Miami's native-born population at the time.
The 1980 census, conducted days before the Mariel supply shock, reports that 40.7 percent of Miami's male workforce was foreign-born, with 65.1 percent of the immigrants born in Cuba and another 11.2 percent born in other Latin American countries. The restriction to non-Hispanics also ensures that the post-Mariel wage trends are not skewed by a composition effect created by the large post-1980 wave of new Hispanic immigrants into many local labor markets. 12
The dependent variable will be the worker's log weekly earnings, where weekly earnings are defined as the ratio of annual income in the previous calendar year to the number of weeks worked. 13 I use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all urban consumers to deflate the earnings data (1980 = 100) . For expositional consistency and unless otherwise noted, whenever I refer to a particular year hereafter, it will be the year in which earnings were actually received by a worker, as opposed to the CPS survey year. 14 It is important to document what we know about the skill distribution of the Marielitos. As noted earlier, the Mariel supply shock began a few days after the 1980 census enumeration, so that the first large survey that contains a large sample of the Marielitos is the 1990 census. Nevertheless, a few CPS supplements conducted in the 1980s provide information on a very small sample of Cuban immigrants who arrived at the time of Mariel. Table 1 reports the education distribution of the sample of adult Cuban immigrants who arrived in 1980 (or in 1980-1981, depending on the data set) and who were enumerated in various surveys sometime between 1983 and 2000. The calculation includes the entire population of Marielitos (workers and non-workers, as well as men and women) who were at least 18 years old as of 1980.
12 The restriction to non-Hispanics implies that few of the low-skill workers in the sample are foreign-born. According to the 1980 census, only 18.7 percent of non-Hispanic high school dropouts in Miami were foreign-born (as compared to 6.4 percent outside Miami). In contrast, 55.1 percent of the non-Hispanic dropouts in Miami were black (as compared to 17.6 percent outside Miami). The key native-born group potentially affected by the Marielitos, therefore, was the low-skill African-American workforce.
13 I replicated the analysis using the log hourly wage as an alternative measure of a worker's income. Because the measure of usual hours worked weekly in the March CPS is noisy, the results are similar but less precisely estimated.
14 For example, a discussion of the earnings of workers in 1985 refers to the data drawn from the 1986 March CPS.
The crucial implication of the table is that the Mariel supply shock consisted of workers who were very unskilled, with a remarkably large fraction being high school dropouts. 15 Despite the variation in sample size and the almost 20-year span in the surveys examined in the table, the fraction of Marielitos who lacked a high school diploma hovers around 60 percent. Table 1 also shows that a very small fraction of these immigrants were college graduates (around 10 percent).
It is insightful to compare the education distribution of the Marielitos with that of the pre-existing workforce. The last row of Table 1 shows that only 26.7 percent of labor force participants in the Miami metropolitan area were high school dropouts. In fact, Miami's workforce was remarkably balanced in terms of its skill distribution, with 20 to 30 percent of workers in each of the four education groups. 16 Table 2 summarizes what we know about the magnitude of the Mariel supply shock.
There were 176,300 high school dropouts in Miami's labor force just prior to Mariel (out of a total of 659,400). According to the 1990 census, 60,100 Cuban workers migrated (as adults) either in 1980 or 1981. If we make a slight adjustment for the small number who entered the country in 1981, Mariel increased the size of the labor force by 55,700 persons, of which almost 60 percent were high school dropouts. 17 Although the Mariel supply shock increased Miami's workforce by 8.4 percent and increased the number of the most educated workers by 3 to 5 percent, the number of low-skill workers rose by a remarkable 18.4 percent. Moreover, this supply shock occurred almost overnight. The Coast Guard reports that the first Marielitos arrived in Florida on April 23, 1980, and that over 100,000 refugees had been admitted by June 3 (Stabile and Scheina 2015) .
III. Descriptive Evidence
The very low skills of the Marielitos indicates that we should perhaps focus our attention on the labor market outcomes of the least educated workers in Miami to get a first-order sense of whether the supply shock had any impact on Miami's wage structure. In fact, the literature sparked by Borjas (2003) suggests that it is important to match the immigrants to corresponding native workers by skill groups. Educational attainment is a skill category that would seem to be extremely relevant in an examination of the Mariel supply shock.
Any empirical study of the impact of Mariel runs into an immediate data problem:
The number of workers enumerated by the CPS in the Miami labor market is small, introducing a lot of random noise into the calculations. The top panel of Table 3 (other than taking a moving average), so that it provides a very transparent indication of what happened to low-skill wages in pre-and post-Mariel Miami.
Despite the similarity in wage trends between Miami and the rest of the country prior to 1980, and despite the small sample size for the Miami metropolitan area, it is obvious that something happened in 1980 that caused the two wage series to diverge in a statistically significant way. Before Mariel, the log wage of high school dropouts in Miami was about 0.1 log points below that of workers in the rest of the country. By 1985, the gap had widened to 0.4 log points, implying that whatever caused the divergence had lowered Beginning with the 1977 survey, the March CPS identifies 43 other metropolitan areas that can be combined in some fashion to construct a sort of placebo. Card (1980, p. 249; emphasis added) describes the construction of his control group as follows: It is important to emphasize that the four cities in the Card placebo were chosen partly based on employment trends observed after the Mariel supply shock. Put differently, if Mariel worsened employment conditions in Miami, the Card placebo is comparing the poorer outcomes of workers in Miami to the outcomes of workers in cities where some other factor worsened their opportunities as well. It is obviously preferable to exogenize the choice of a placebo by comparing cities that were roughly similar prior to the treatment, rather than being similar after one of them was injected with a very large supply shock.
The various panels of Figure 3 illustrate the wage trends in Miami and several potential placebos between 1976 and 1992. 19 The top panel shows that the log wage of high school dropouts declined dramatically after 1980 when compared to what happened in the cities that make up the Card placebo. Of course, trends in absolute wages reflect many factors that are specific to local labor markets, so that it is possible that these ups and downs capture idiosyncratic shifts that affected all workers in Miami. The Mariel supply shock, however, specifically targeted the least educated workers and the bottom two panels of the figure show that the relative wage of high school dropouts in Miami-relative to either college graduates or high school graduates-also declined dramatically after Mariel, and also recovered by 1990. In sum, the wage trends observed in Miami consistently indicate that the economic well-being of the least educated workers in Miami took a downward turn shortly after 1980, reached its nadir around 1985-1986, and did not recover fully until 1990.
As noted above, the cities in the Card placebo do not make up a proper control group because they were chosen, in part, so that post-Mariel employment conditions in the placebo cities resembled those in Miami. To determine the set of cities that had comparable Figure  3 , which is used in the regression analysis reported below, calculates the mean log wage for each survey, and then takes a simple moving average of those means. 1977-1978. 20 Column 1 of Table 4 reports the employment growth rate for each of the 44 metropolitan areas, ranked by the growth rate.
Miami's pre-Mariel employment conditions were quite robust, ranking 6 th in the rate of employment growth. Note that all the cities that make up the Card placebo had lower growth rates than Miami between 1977 and 1980. In fact, the average employment growth rate in those four cities (weighted by the city's employment) was 6.9 percent, less than half the 15.3 percent growth rate in Miami. Table 3 to construct a new placebo, which I call the "employment placebo", by simply choosing the four cities that were most similar to Miami prior to 1980. Specifically, the employment placebo consists of the four cities (Anaheim, Rochester, Nassau-Suffolk, and San Jose) ranked just above and just below Miami. I also constructed an alternative "low-skill placebo" by choosing the four cities that had similar pre-Mariel growth for low-skill employment. Column 2 of Table 4 reports the rate of employment growth for high school dropouts. Miami also ranked 6th by this metric.
I use the rankings reported in
Coincidentally, two of the cities with similar low-skill employment growth are in the Card placebo (Los Angeles and Houston; the other two are Gary and Indianapolis). Figure 3 shows that the post-1980 Miami experience was also unusual when compared to this placebo, with a wage drop of 30 percent (which lies in between the effects implied by the
Card and employment placebos).
20 A person is employed if he or she works in the CPS reference week. The 1980 survey, collected in March, is not affected by the supply shock, as the Marielitos did not begin to arrive until late April.
The choice of a placebo obviously plays a crucial role in determining the magnitude of the wage impact of Mariel. There is an element of arbitrariness in how a placebo is created, so that the researcher's choice of a particular placebo can exaggerate or attenuate the wage effect. There are, for example, 123,410 potential 4-city placebos that can be created from 43 metropolitan areas. It might be reasonable to expect a huge dispersion in the estimated wage effect of the Marielitos across the 123,410 potential comparisons. I will report below the distribution of estimated wage impacts across all potential four-city placebos and show that Mariel had a negative impact regardless of which placebo is chosen.
Alternatively, one can employ the synthetic control method developed by Abadie and Garbazeadal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) . The method essentially searches across all potential placebo cities and derives a weight that combines cities to create a new synthetic city. This synthetic city is the one that best resembles the pre-Mariel Miami labor market along some set of pre-specified conditions. Unlike the hands-on method that I used to create the employment and low-skill placebos, the synthetic control allows the construction of the synthetic city to be based on several characteristics. The synthetic control approach seems to limit the researcher's ability to make arbitrary decisions about what the proper placebo should be. Note, however, that there is still an element of arbitrariness. The researcher must specify the vector of variables that should be comparable between Miami and the placebo in the pre-treatment period. As I show below, different choices of control variables lead to different estimates of the wage impact.
Initially, I construct the synthetic city by using three such control variables: the rate of employment growth in the 4-year period prior to Mariel (i.e., the variable used to define the employment placebo); the concurrent rate of employment growth for high school dropouts (the variable used to define the low-skill placebo); and the concurrent rate of wage growth for high school dropouts. The last column of Table 3 shows that the low-skill market in Miami also had robust wage growth prior to Mariel, ranking 13 th in the country. It is interesting to examine the weights attached to each city by the synthetic control method. When looking at the log wage of high school dropouts, the method assigns the largest weights to Anaheim (0.40), Rochester (0.20), San Diego (0.18), and San Jose (0.06).
By looking at the ranking of those cities in Table 3 , it is obvious that the synthetic control method consistently selects metropolitan areas that had robust labor markets prior to Mariel.
Finally, it is easy to establish that the steep drop in the low-skill wage in post-Mariel Miami was a very unusual event. The average wage of male high-school dropouts in Miami fell by about 37 percent between 1976-1979 and 1981-1986 . We can calculate the comparable wage change in every other metropolitan area for all equivalent time periods between 1976 and 2003 and see if the Mariel experience stands out. 21 Obviously, if 37percent wage cuts happen frequently in local labor markets, it would be harder to claim that Miami's experience had much to do with the Marielitos. Perhaps something else was going on-a something else that other cities experience often enough at different timesthat just happened to coincide with the timing of Castro's decision.
To assess how Miami's post-Mariel experience compares to that of the entire distribution of wage changes, I calculated the wage change between every single pretreatment period τ (1976-1979, 1977-1980,…,1993-1996) and the corresponding posttreatment period τ′ (1981-1986, 1982-1987,…,1998-2003) . Specifically, I pooled the March CPS data for the four years in each pre-treatment period and the six years in each posttreatment period, and calculated the average log wage in each city-period permutation. To In short, something unique happened to the economic status of high school dropouts in Miami in the early 1980s. The event that shocked the wage structure in Miami at the time of Mariel, whatever it happened to be, happens rarely and its adverse consequences were targeted very narrowly on workers who lacked a high school diploma.
IV. Robustness of the Descriptive Evidence
Given the striking picture that the raw data implies about the labor market impact of the Marielitos, and given the very contentious debate over immigration policy both in the United States and abroad, it is important to establish that the evidence is robust. I now address two distinct issues to evaluate the sensitivity of the results. First, was the decline in the wage of high school dropouts in the Miami of the early 1980s recorded by other contemporaneous data sets, such as the CPS Outgoing Rotation Groups (ORG)? And, second, is the evidence robust to the inclusion of women in the analysis?
22 See the contrasting arguments of Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2012) .
Results from the CPS-ORG
It is well known that wage trends recorded by the March CPS sometimes differ from the comparable wage trends recorded by the CPS Outgoing Rotation Groups. Unlike the March CPS, which reports annual earnings in the calendar year prior to the survey, the ORG gives a measure of the hourly wage for respondents who are paid by the hour and of the usual weekly wage for all other workers. The ORG time series begins in 1979, so that the pre-treatment period only contains one year of data. Following Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) and Lemieux (2006) , I extend the pre-treatment period back by using the roughly comparable May CPS supplements for the pre-1979 years. 23
One key advantage of the ORG data is that it contains much larger samples; by construction, roughly three times the size of the March CPS. However, this advantage is somewhat neutralized by the need to use the May CPS files to create a longer pre-treatment period. The May files, like the March CPS, are monthly surveys and both have equally small samples. In fact, as Table 3 shows, the number of high school dropouts enumerated in pre- Before proceeding to further document the potential disparities in wage trends across the different surveys, it is convenient to first adjust the data for differences in the age distribution of workers in different time periods and in different metropolitan areas. I used a simple regression model to calculate the age-adjusted mean wage of a skill group in a particular market. Specifically, I estimated the following individual-level earnings regression separately in each CPS cross-section:
where w irst is the wage of worker i in city r in education group s at time t; θ r is a vector of fixed effects indicating city of residence; and A i is a vector of fixed effects giving the worker's age. 25 The fixed effects θ r deflate the log wage for regional wage differences. The average residual from this regression for cell (r, s, t) gives the age-adjusted mean wage of 24 To increase sample size in the pre-treatment period, the January, February, and March samples of the 1980 ORG are added to the 1979 data, as those early months are unaffected by Mariel. The calculation of the average log wage in the cell weighs each individual observation by the product of the person's earnings weight times the usual number of hours worked weekly.
25 I used seven age groups to create the fixed effects (25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, and 55-59) . 
Inclusion of Women
It is tempting to increase the number of observations available to examine wage trends in Miami before and after Mariel by including women in the analysis. However, female labor force participation was increasing very rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s, so that wage trends are likely to be affected by the changing gender composition of the workforce as well as by the selection that marks women's entry into the labor market. Moreover, female participation increased differentially across cities. For example, the 1970 decennial census data reports that 35.3 percent of Anaheim's workforce was female; by 1990, this fraction had risen by almost 10 percentage points to 45.1 percent. The increase in San Diego was similar, from 34.0 to 42.5 percent. In Miami, however, the increase was far smaller, from 40.2 percent to 42.1 percent. Table 3 shows that including women would indeed increase the sample size of low-skill workers in Miami, from an average of 19.5 in each pre-1990 March CPS cross-section to an average of 34.5. Because of the male-female wage gap (which may itself be changing over time), the differential rates of growth in female labor force participation across cities distort relative wage trends between Miami and any placebo.
The bottom panel of
Therefore, an analysis that examines the pooled earnings of men and women must (at the very least) account for the changing gender composition of the workforce. I adjust for this composition effect by running the following wage regression in the pooled sample of men and women in each cross-section of the CPS:
where F i is a dummy variable set to unity if the worker is female. The residual from this regression gives the age-and gender-adjusted wage of worker i in year t.
The two panels of Figure 6 illustrate the trends in the average adjusted wage observed in the pooled sample of men and women in both the March and ORG files. It is evident that adding women to the sample does not change the insight that something happened in Miami after 1980. It is important to stress, however, that the gender-adjusted wage trends are still contaminated by (unknown) differences across cities in the nature of the selection that motivates only some women to enter the labor market. The statistical difficulties associated with purging the data from this type of selection bias suggest that the most credible evidence of the Mariel impact on the price of skills is likely drawn from samples that examine the wage trends among prime-age men.
V. Regression Results
To estimate the impact of the Mariel supply shock relative to the various placebos, I use the mean age-adjusted log wage of male high school dropouts in city r at time t, denoted by . This wage becomes the dependent variable in a generic difference-indifferences regression model:
where θ r is a vector of city fixed effects; θ t is a vector of year fixed effects; 1981-1983, 1984-1986, 1987-1989, or 1990-1992 . Regardless of the placebo used, the wage effect immediately after Mariel is negative, indicating an absolute decline in the wage of low-skill workers in Miami. All the regressions also suggest that the wage impact was stronger between 1983 and 1986 than between 1981 and 1983. On average, it seems that the low-skill wage in the first six years after
Mariel fell by at least 20 or 30 percent. Finally, the evidence indicates that the wage effect weakened after 1986, and essentially disappeared by 1990.
Panel B reports comparable coefficients from regressions estimated in the ORG data.
Although the wage impact in the first six years after Mariel is again consistently negative, it is numerically smaller, hovering around 10 percent. 29 The ORG regressions also suggest an eventual attenuation of the impact.
To easily illustrate the sensitivity of the regression evidence, the remainder of the analysis uses a simpler form of the model in equation (3), focusing on the years between 1977 and 1986 (excluding 1980) . The short-run wage effect reported in Table 6 is simply the interaction between the indicator for the Miami metropolitan area and the indicator for a post-1980 observation. Among men, the short-run impact ranges from about 10 to 30 percent. The table also reports the analogous coefficient estimated using the age-and gender-adjusted wage in the pooled sample of men and women. Although these effects are weaker (between 5 and 20 percent), they are always negative and significant.
It is also instructive to extend the synthetic control approach to estimate the distribution of short-run wage effects implied by an intriguing counterfactual exercise.
What would the distribution of estimated effects look like if we acted as if each city had experienced a shock in 1980, and simply calculated the pre-post wage change attributable to that imaginary supply shock relative to each city's synthetic control? 30 Would the wage effect estimated for the actual Mariel supply shock look all that unusual when compared to the entire distribution of hypothetical wage effects?
29 Although the ORG wage effects are one-half to one-third the size of the corresponding effects in the March CPS, the standard errors imply that the difference is often not statistically significant. A large part of the difference in point estimates between the two data sets can be attributed to labor supply effects and to measurement issues related to labor supply. For example, the short-run wage impact for men using all other metropolitan areas as a placebo is -0.279 (0.062) in the March CPS and -0.086 (0.023) in the ORG. The estimated coefficient in the March CPS falls to -0.263 (0.053) if I used the log hourly wage rate instead of log weekly earnings as the dependent variable. The estimated coefficient falls further, to -0.216 (0.059), if the average wage in a cell was calculated as in the ORG, using a weight equal to the sampling weight times the number of hours worked weekly (rather than the sampling weight times the number of weeks worked annually). Finally, the effect would fall even more, to -0.167 (0.075), if the sample was limited to persons who worked in the reference week (as in the ORG). In short, conceptual and measurement issues related to labor supply account for about half the difference in point estimates.
To be more specific, I again define the pre-treatment period as 1977-1979 and the post-treatment period as 1981-1986 . Imagine that the city of Akron was hit by a phantom supply shock in 1980. We can then calculate the wage trends in Akron and in Akron's synthetic control in the pre-and post-treatment periods, and estimate the difference-indifferences regression model in equation (3). Presumably, the wage effect resulting from this exercise should be near zero because Fidel Castro did not suddenly decide to relocate over 100,000 Cubans to Akron in 1980. However, other (random) things may have happened in post-1980 Akron that we know nothing about and that may have changed the relative wage of low-skill workers in that city relative to its synthetic control.
I constructed each city's synthetic control by using the same control variables introduced earlier: the city's rate of employment growth, and the concurrent rates of employment and wage growth for the low-skill workforce. I then estimated the regression model in equation (3) to calculate the short-run wage impact for each city relative to its synthetic control. Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of the estimated effects on the log wage of male high school dropouts. Although there is a lot of dispersion across all the hypothetical shocks, the mean effect is numerically equal to zero. 31 Both the March CPS and the ORG imply that the wage effect induced by the real Mariel supply shock was the most negative wage impact observed during the period.
Although the regression results unambiguously indicate that the Mariel supply shock harmed low-skill workers, the overall evidence may not be consistent with the textbook model of factor demand. The March CPS data suggest that the adverse wage effect of the Marielitos initially increased over time before eventually disappearing. This is hard to square with the theoretical prediction that the wage effect should be largest right after the supply shock and would weaken as the capital stock adjusted over time.
There has been little research on the dynamics of immigration-induced supply shocks. But there has been much work on the dynamics of demand shocks. The presumption that wages are sticky downwards is a common feature in business cycle models. In fact, many studies, such as those that examine the impact of oil shocks (Hamilton 1983) , recognize that the largest effects of demand shocks do not happen immediately. It typically takes a few years for the adverse shock to reverberate through the labor market.
In the Mariel context, it may also be that employers exploited sticky nominal wages during the high inflation of the early 1980s as a way of passing through the wage cuts. Given the well-documented lags between demand shocks and their consequences, we do not yet know if the dynamics of the wage data in post-Mariel Miami are consistent with the expected effects of a supply shock. 32 We also do not fully understand why the relative wage of low-skill workers in Miami recovered after a decade (as illustrated in Figure 3 ). Economic theory implies that it is the average wage that will return to its pre-Mariel level if the production function is linear homogeneous (Borjas 2014) . The relative wage effect will not go away unless there has also been a change in the relative quantities of low-and high-skill labor.
The coefficients reported in Table 6 suggest that the wage of male high school dropouts in Miami fell by 10 to 30 percent during the first 6 years after Mariel (depending on the placebo and data set used). The supply shock increased the number of high school dropouts by around 20 percent, so that the implied wage elasticity (d log w/d log L) is between -0.5 and -1.5.
Either of these elasticity estimates is far higher than the typical wage effect estimated in non-experimental cross-city regressions that link wages to immigration (which sometimes cluster around a negligible number). They are also higher than the wage elasticities estimated by correlating wages and immigration across skill groups in the national labor market (Borjas 2003) , an elasticity that clusters around -0.3 to -0.4. However, the estimates are close to those reported in Monras (2015) and Llull (2015) , who use new instruments (including the Peso Crisis in Mexico, natural disasters, armed conflicts, and 32 Another potential explanation for the delayed impact is that perhaps Miami continued to be hit by large supply shocks, which eventually subsided by the late 1980s. The data from the 1990 census, however, is not consistent with this conjecture. After the entry of the Marielitos, there was a steady flow of low-skill immigrants into Miami, increasing their number by 9.1 percent in 1982-1984, by 8.6 percent in 1985-1986, and by 11.8 percent in 1987-1990 . The Miami experience was not unusual. There was a surge in low-skill immigration in the 1980s throughout the country, so that many of the cities that often end up in the placebos experienced similar supply shocks. In Anaheim, new arrivals increased the number of low-skill immigrants by 11.1 percent in 1982-1984, by 11.1 percent in 1985-1986, and by 17.9 percent in 1987-1990 . The respective statistics for the cities in the low-skill placebo are 8.6 percent, 7.7 percent, and 10.0 percent, respectively. changes in political conditions) to correct for the endogeneity of migration flows. Monras reports a wage elasticity of -0.7 while Llull estimates an elasticity of about -1.2.
There are obviously many caveats that need to be resolved regarding the specification of the regression model and the external validity of the Mariel experience before we fully buy into an elasticity estimate of between -0.5 and -1.5. Nevertheless, the key implication of the evidence is unambiguous. The wage of high school dropouts in the Miami labor market fell significantly after the Mariel supply shock. Any attempt at rationalizing this fact as due to something other than the Marielitos will need to specify precisely what those other factors were.
VI. The Choice of a Placebo
One lesson from the evidence presented in the previous sections is that the choice of a placebo matters. To easily document this sensitivity, I estimated the short-run wage impact using alternative specifications of the synthetic control method, where I use different sets of control variables to create the synthetic city.
Specifically, row 1 of Table 7 again reports the impact estimated with the controls introduced earlier: employment growth, low-skill employment growth, and low-skill wage growth. The wage impact (in the sample of men) is -0.34 in the March CPS and -0.16 in the ORG. The control variables in row 2 are those used by Card (1990) to (manually) define his placebo: employment growth, percent of the workforce that is Hispanic, and percent that is black. Note that the implied wage impact in the March CPS is about the same, but the wage impact in the ORG drops by almost half to -0.09.
Although it may seem sensible to include percent Hispanic as a control variable, the use of this variable could be problematic. There is a lot of heterogeneity within the Hispanic population; the labor market opportunities available to low-skill Cubans probably have little in common with those available to low-skill Mexicans. Rows 2 and 3 show that the estimated wage effect can vary by 5 percentage points (in either direction) depending on whether the control variable is the fraction that is Hispanic or the fraction that is Cuban.
The implied synthetic city in row 2, which uses percent Hispanic, is an amalgam of Greensboro-Winston (with a weight of 0.44), Los Angeles (0.53), and San Diego (0.03).
Simply replacing percent Hispanic with percent Cuban changes the synthetic city to
Greensboro-Winston (0.33), Newark (.46), and Tampa (.21). Not surprisingly, the implied synthetic city is very sensitive to the choice of control variables, so that careful consideration needs to be given to which set of variables should be included in the model. Table 6 presents the most general specification, which adds variables denoting the fraction of the workforce in each of 11 industries, as well as the fraction of the workforce that is female or low-skill. 33 The estimated wage impact is -0.33 in the March CPS and -0.10 in the ORG. Put bluntly, the construction of the placebo is not an innocuous decision-even when the methodology used to construct the placebo is thought to be relatively free of researcher intervention (as the synthetic control method is sometimes advertised).
Row 5 of
One alternative (and perhaps preferable) way of determining whether the key finding of a negative wage impact is sensitive to the choice of placebo is to estimate the wage impact for every potential placebo, and then examine the resulting distribution of potential wage effects. I illustrate this approach by using the regression model in equation
(3) to estimate the short-run effect in each of the 123,410 possible four-city placebos.
The two panels of Figure 7 illustrate the frequency distribution of estimated effects when the dependent variable is the log wage of male high school dropouts, while Table 8 reports summary statistics for the distributions. Consider the density of estimated effects in the March CPS data. The mean effect is -0.283, and almost all of the effects are statistically significant.
Note that if the set of placebos is restricted to those where the average employment growth in the four placebo cities was roughly similar to that of pre-Mariel Miami, the mean wage effect rises to -0.319. If we look at the smaller subset where both average employment growth and average low-skill employment growth was similar to that of Miami, the mean wage effect rises further to -0.330. Put differently, the closer we get to a placebo that seems to replicate the pre-existing conditions in Miami, the more likely we are to find that the Marielitos had a larger wage effect on low-skill Miamians. Table 8 shows that the same trend is implied by the frequency distribution of wage effects computed in the ORG data. Card's (1990) classic paper on the labor market impact of the Mariel supply shock stands as a landmark study in labor economics. The finding that the supply shock had little effect on the labor market opportunities of native workers influenced what we think we know about the economic consequences of immigration. And the elegance of the methodological approach-the exploitation of a fascinating natural experiment to estimate a parameter of economic interest-also influenced the way that many applied economists frame their questions, organize the data, and search for an answer. This paper brings a new perspective to the analysis of the Mariel supply shock. I revisit the question and the data armed with the insights provided by three decades of research on the economic impact of immigration. One key lesson from the vast literature is that the effect of immigration on the wage structure depends crucially on the differences between the skill distributions of immigrants and natives. The direct effect of immigration is most likely to be felt by those workers who had similar capabilities as the Marielitos.
VII. Conclusion
The Mariel supply shock was composed of disproportionately low-skill workers; about 60 percent were high school dropouts. Remarkably, none of the previous examinations of the Mariel experience documented what happened to the pre-existing high school dropouts in Miami, a group that composed over a quarter of the city's workforce.
Given the literature sparked by Borjas (2003) , it seems obvious that any analysis of the Mariel supply shock should focus on the labor market outcomes of these low-skill workers.
The examination of wage trends among high school dropouts quickly overturns the stylized fact that the supply shock did not affect Miami's wage structure. In fact, the absolute wage of high school dropouts dropped dramatically, as did their wage relative to that of either high school graduates or college graduates. The drop in the average wage of the least skilled Miamians between 1977-1979 and 1981-1986 was substantial, between 10 and 30 percent. In fact, the examination of wage trends in every other city identified by the CPS shows that the steep post-Mariel wage drop experienced by Miami's low-skill workforce was a very unusual event.
The reappraisal presented in this paper also illustrates that the researcher's choice of a placebo is an important element of any such empirical exercise, and that picking a different placebo can easily lead to a weaker or stronger measured impact of immigration.
The synthetic control method, for example, can generate very different wage effects depending on the set of variables that the researcher uses to construct the synthetic city.
Similarly, the magnitude of the wage effect differs substantially across all potential fourcity placebos that can be constructed in the CPS data. It is important to emphasize, however, that despite the variation in the magnitude of the wage effects across placebos, the evidence consistently indicates that the Marielitos had a sizable negative effect on the wage of competing workers.
The evidence has potentially important implications for the literature that purports to measure the wage impact of immigration. Many studies measure the effect by estimating spatial correlations between wages and the number of immigrants in a particular locality.
These spatial correlations are plagued both by endogeneity problems (i.e. immigrants settle in high-wage regions) and by native adjustments (i.e., firms and workers may respond to the supply shock by relocating to other cities). The fact that the spatial correlation implied by the Mariel supply shock is strongly negative indicates that the existing non-experimental literature may not have successfully overcome those statistical difficulties. There is still some way to go before non-experimental spatial correlations can be presumed to estimate a parameter of economic interest.
The evidence also has implications for estimates of the economic benefits from immigration. The benefit that accrues to the native population, or the immigration surplus, is the flip side of the wage impact of immigration. In fact, the greater the wage impact, the greater the immigration surplus. Borjas (2014, p. 151) estimates the current surplus to be around 0.24 percent of GDP, or around $43 billion annually. Because there was a much larger reduction in the earnings of the workers most likely to be affected by the Marielitos than was previously believed, we may need to reassess existing estimates of the immigration surplus. That surplus could easily be two or three times as large if the Mariel context correctly measures the wage impact.
It has been a quarter-century since the publication of Card's Mariel study. The reappraisal of the evidence presented in this paper suggests that much can be gained by revisiting some of those persistent old questions with a new perspective, a perspective that uses the insights accumulated over the years. If nothing else, the reappraisal of the Mariel evidence shows that even the most cursory reexamination of some old data with some new ideas can reveal trends that radically change what we think we know. Notes: The log hourly wage is a 3-year moving average of the average log wage of high school dropouts in each geographic area in Figure 5A , and of the age-adjusted wage in Figure 5B 1977-1986 (1980 excluded) , and the coefficients measure the impact in the short run (i.e., 1981-1986) . All regressions were weighted by the number of observations used to calculate the mean wage of high school dropouts in city r at time t. Notes: The rate of employment growth is the log ratio of average employment in 1979-1980 to average employment in 1977-1978, calculated from the 1977-1980 survey years of the March CPS. The rate of wage growth is the difference in the (age-adjusted) log weekly wage between 1978-1979 and 1976-1977. Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The data consist of annual observations for each city between 1977 and 1992 (1980 excluded). All regressions include vectors of city and year fixed effects. The table reports the interaction coefficients between a dummy variable indicating if the metropolitan area is Miami and the timing of the post-Mariel period. The regressions that use the Card, employment, or low-skill placebos have 75 observations; the regressions that use the synthetic placebo have 30 observations; and the regressions in the last column have 658 observations. All regressions are weighted by the number of observations used to calculate the dependent variable. The number of observations of the synthetic control is a weighted average of the sample size in the actual cities that make up the synthetic city. Table 5 for more details on the regression specification. Table 5 for more details on the regression specification. Table 5 for more details on the regression specification.
